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World War Web: Rethinking 
“Aiding and Abetting” in the 
Social Media Age 
Rebecca J. Cambron* 
ISIS’s use of social media presents a new challenge for 
counterterror efforts. The organization aims to recruit followers 
and incite violence through social media. Given that this is a 
new medium for terrorist organizations, social media companies 
have come under fire for indirectly providing ISIS with far-
reaching platforms to spread its content. The companies, as well 
as national governments and international entities, have 
attempted to respond to the threat posed by such content. These 
responses, however, have proven ineffective. This Note argues 
that to effectively respond to and combat the threat posed by 
terrorist speech, national governments should adopt a new 
approach—an approach which holds social media companies 
responsible for aiding and abetting terrorist speech inciting 
violence. Identifying the specific threat as stemming from 
terrorist speech recruiting for or directly inciting violence 
narrows the scope of social media companies’ potential liability. 
Additionally, the use of INTERPOL’s existing information-
sharing systems provides a means of maintaining a “bird’s eye 
view” of terrorism’s trends, while its National Central Bureaus 
provide nation-specific notifications of terrorist speech. 
Subsequently, national law enforcement should impose the aiding 
and abetting standard on social media companies that fail to 
remove the content identified by INTERPOL. Through this 
blend of international and national enforcement, freedom of 
expression receives protection through the limited scope of 
liability while moving towards improved national and global 
security. 
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I. Introduction 
 The world has changed significantly since it first came in contact 
with those who orchestrated the bombing of the World Trade Center 
in September 2001. While many have used terrorism as a tactic to 
achieve their political or religious ends, al-Qaeda blazed a new trail. 
Fast-forward to today, the non-state actor birthed by al-Qaeda 
presents a host of new challenges to the national security community. 
Unlike those who have relied on terrorism before, the non-state actor 
has no formal government which the U.N. or national governments 
may sanction.1 Fluid boundaries make precise counterattacks 
challenging.2 Government must now launch wars against groups few 
have heard of, lacking a definition of who or what it can declare war 
against.3 
The traditional understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism 
tactics no longer provides an adequate response to the threat posed 
 
1. See NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NONSTATE ACTORS: IMPACT ON 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1 
(2007), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nonstate_actors_2007.pdf 
(discussing impact of non-state actors in international law).  
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
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by non-state terrorist organizations, like ISIS and al-Qaeda.4 The 
characteristics of their groups alone posed a challenge to the defense 
and intelligence communities following 9/11.5 But an additional 
complication emerged in the early 2000s: society changed. Following 
the increased use of the internet, the rise of social media platforms 
catalyzed non-state actors’ abilities to spread their message.6 Social 
media effectively eliminated organization costs, allowing terrorist 
groups to easily create a global, structured threat. 
The confluence of non-state terrorist organizations and social 
media generates a host of new challenges for combatting terrorism. 
ISIS, also known as the Islamic State, IS, Daesh, or ISIL,7 exemplifies 
how terrorist organizations may use social media companies’ platforms 
in the future. Viewing the online, social-media world as a new 
“theater of war” for terrorism requires experts, policy makers, and 
those tasked with combatting terrorism to think differently about 
counterterrorism methods.8 More fundamentally, however, it forces 
them to prioritize the value judgments they make in creating policies 
and strategies. 
Those combatting terrorism have attempted to reduce the threat 
through a variety of methods.9 But the threat persists. This Note 
argues that to address the new challenges, national governments 
should hold social media companies responsible for aiding and 
abetting terrorist speech used to recruit for and incite violence 
through an international standard. Relying on the foundation laid in 
customary international law for complicity-based liability, national 
jurisdictions can impose responsibility when social media companies 
facilitate terrorist speech by permitting the speech to remain on the 
platforms. A limited definition of “terrorist speech” based on the type 
of content and the terrorist organization posting it aids in limiting the 
 
4. See id. (commenting that non-state actors, such as terrorists, challenge 
governments and are using new technology). 
5. Id. 
6. See generally Jarred Prier, Commanding the Trend Social Media as 
Information Warfare, 11 STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY 50 (2017). 
7. Faisal Irshaid, Isis, Isil, IS or Daesh? One Group, Many Names, BBC 
NEWS (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-
27994277 [https://perma.cc/KA9P-AF2Y]. 
8. 9/11 Memorial & Museum, The Future of the Jihadist 
Threat, YOUTUBE (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=c3hyU16oGjU [https://perma.cc/T6HG-7VLG]. 
9. See David Patrikarakos, Social Media Networks Are the Handmaiden to 
Dangerous Propaganda, TIME (Nov. 2, 2017), 
http://time.com/5008076/nyc-terror-attack-isis-facebook-russia/ 
[https://perma.cc/VU3G-JBTD] (noting the inadequacies of current 
responses by the U.S. government and social media companies). 
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scope of liability. Within the limited scope, INTERPOL and national 
judicial systems may combine efforts to effectively address the new 
threat to global security. 
Part I of this Note will discuss the background of terrorist 
organizations’ current use of social media and the short-sighted and 
patchwork responses from social media companies, national 
governments, and international entities. It will identify key obstacles 
to effective responses and potential ways to overcome them. 
Subsequently, Part II will argue that a more effective solution can 
come from holding social media companies responsible for aiding and 
abetting the terrorist organizations under a system of joint 
enforcement by national jurisdictions and INTERPOL. Part II will 
also define the scope of liability based on a limited definition of 
“terrorist speech” and how the presence of such speech on social 
media platforms constitutes aiding and abetting. Using this definition 
to limit the scope of enforcement, Part II will continue by describing 
the system of implementation through both INTERPOL’s monitoring 
and notification processes, and national governments’ law 
enforcement. This collaborative system of operation ensures the most 
responsive means of addressing developments in terrorist speech. 
Should companies fail to remove the content after notification, 
national law enforcement and judiciaries may step in and prosecute 
under the international standard. Lastly, Part III concludes that 
imposing responsibility does not undermine free speech or national 
sovereignty, but instead utilizes a narrow definition of “terrorist 
speech,” restricting a limited form of communication connected to 
violent actions of national concern. In such a manner, joint 
implementation simultaneously respects national sovereignty and 
individual rights while combating the global threat posed by terrorist 
speech on social media. 
II. ISIS’s Development and Established Use of Social 
Media Has Yet To Be Effectively Countered By 
Social Media Companies or Government  Entities. 
Social media companies and governments have struggled in their 
counterterrorism efforts to appropriately respond to the nature of the 
threat posed by terrorist speech on social media. With the birth and 
subsequent proliferation of social media into everyday life, the Islamic 
State discovered a global medium for its message.10 The example set 
by ISIS for future terrorist organizations creates a new challenge for 
countering such organizations’ behavior.11 Responses by the platform’s 
 
10. William McCants, THE ISIS APOCALYPSE: THE HISTORY, STRATEGY, AND 
DOOMSDAY VISION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 5 (2015). 
11. The Brookings Institution, Panel, Al-Qaida, The Islamic State, and the 
Future of the Global Jihadi Movement: A Conversation with 
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companies and governments inadequately address terrorism-related 
content that incites violence or participation in violence; ignoring the 
inevitable development of terrorist tactics requires more long-term, 
systematic solutions.12 
A. Fueled by its Ideology, ISIS Melds its Religious Zealotry with Social 
Media to Facilitate its Ideological and Political Goals 
The new world created by social media transformed not only the 
way regular individuals engage with each other, but also opened up a 
new means of communication exploitable by non-state terrorist 
organizations. Social media’s growth during the early 2000s coincided 
with the rise of a new ideological strand of Islamic jihadist 
teachings—teachings which formed ISIS’s foundation.13 This collision 
of events enabled ISIS to use social media to advance its ideological 
goals more effectively and directly than its predecessors.14 Despite 
ISIS and al-Qaeda sharing a similar desire for the creation of a 
caliphate, a nation-state based on Islamic laws,15 the two 
organizations varied in how to achieve their political goals.16 These 
different strategies condense into a disagreement as to how much 
support for their political ends each organization seeks from the 
Muslim world.17 Al-Qaeda believes in the necessity of “winning the 
hearts and minds” of local Arab tribes, recalling the Prophet 
Muhammed’s uniting of tribal factions in creating his Islamic state.18 
ISIS, on the other hand, does not require support from the Muslim 
community in the Middle East.1920 
 
Ambassador Tina Kaidanow 4-6 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/20150916_alqaeda_isis_jihad_transcript.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UG7S-GDLA]. 
12. See id. at 6-7 (noting the continuous analysis of the threat posed by 
Islamic extremism and the need for constant re-assessment).  





18. McCants, supra note 10, at 56-7. 
19. 9/11 Memorial & Museum, supra note 8. 
20. Though both ascribing to the teachings of Muhammad, ISIS and al-
Qaeda have developed into two different strands of Islam, much like 
differing protestant denominations. Despite sharing a desire to create a 
caliphate the two organizations varied in three major aspects: (1) 
strategies for achieving caliphates, (2) the timing of when to establish a 
caliphate, and (3) the interpretation of the end times. The strategies for 
achieving a caliphate reflect each “denomination’s” reliance on Muslim 
tribes. Al-Qaeda reflects back on Muhammad’s actions and believe in 
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These differing viewpoints on the role of the Muslim community 
directly influence the willingness of each organization to use violence 
in order to achieve their political objectives.21 Because it has no need 
for support from the Muslim community and therefore openly uses 
violence against those within its geographic control, ISIS turns to and 
relies on foreign fighters and international terror attacks to bolster 
recruitment and keep it in the minds of the public and other 
jihadists.22 The Guardian’s series The Raqqa Diaries recounts life 
inside the ISIS-held city.23 A young man writes of how ISIS first came 
through the city in March 2013 saying: 
They took advantage of our confusion and ignorance. . .. At 
first they would charm people with a softly spoken manner, 
promising them the world. . .. Those who actually believe they 
have come to save us were the first to enter the city; the second 
are much more violent.24 
This approach contrasts with the concern al-Qaeda had with 
maintaining the support of those under their political control, as Bin 
Laden counseled members to avoid killing any other Muslims so as to 
not alienate the community.25 Because they can use violence against 
the Muslim community, social media plays a valuable role in building 
support for ISIS outside of the Middle East. By giving ISIS a way of 
shaping its image, social media helps the organization hide the reality 
experienced in Raqqa and other cities and maintain an online 
presence.26 International attention—and social media as a means of 
 
the need to create a “greater religious identity” within all of the Muslim 
world. Thus, al-Qaeda hesitates to take actions which may alienate 
other Muslims. ISIS, on the other hand, does not believe this “greater 
identity” is required, leaving it free to be more forceful and violent 
against Muslims in the Middle East as it seeks to establish a new 
caliphate. See 9/11 Memorial & Museum, supra note 6 and McCants, 
supra note 8 for Dr. McCant’s further explanation of the intellectual 
development of ISIS from al-Qaeda. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Mike Thomson, The Raqqa Diaries: Life Under Isis Rule, The Observer, 





25. McCants, supra note 10, at 53. 
26. See 9/11 Museum & Memorial, supra note 8 (noting the need for both 
propaganda and public attention). 
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it—therefore plays a key role in fulfilling the ideological basis for 
ISIS’s mission.27 
B. Current Responses by Social Media Companies and Government 
Entities Fail to Appreciate the Long-Term, Global Threat Posed By the 
Combination of Social Media and ISIS. 
Fully addressing the presence of ISIS and its related content on 
social media has proved a challenge on two fronts, namely, (1) in 
undermining why terrorists use social media platforms and (2) in 
constructing adequate and effective responses to that use. Social 
media provides a particularly attractive means for ISIS to promote its 
ideology through its global influence, accessibility, and evolving 
nature.28 These uses, in turn, generate problems for creating effective 
responses by those seeking to prevent the spread of terrorism.29 
Current methods failed to adequately address the long-term, global 
threat with the limited resources devoted to counterterrorism efforts. 
1. Social Media Platforms Create an Attractive Environment for ISIS 
to Spread its Content. 
The environment formed by the internet and social media 
platforms benefits terrorist operations like ISIS. As discussed above, 
ISIS’s ideological background creates a need for international 
attention.30 The internet’s global reach provides a stage for ISIS to 
make its call for violence, amplified through social media’s increasing 
number of users.31 The ease at which those related to or expressing 
support for the organization can create social media accounts, create 
multiple accounts, or re-create accounts, even if banned, fashions an 
environment encouraging to the spread of harmful messages.32 This 
ease of access, in combination with the evolving nature of the 
 
27. Id. 
28. See Patrikarakos, supra note 9 (noting the ease of access, popularity and 
inadequate responses incentivizing ISIS’s use of social media for 
propaganda). 
29. See Olivia Solon, Counter-Terrorism Was Never Meant to be Silicon 




[https://perma.cc/H8MQ-C8VF] (outlining the methods and challenges 
private companies face in countering terrorism propaganda on social 
media). 
30. 9/11 Memorial & Museum, supra note 8. 
31. Patrikarakos, supra note 9. 
32. Rory Cellan-Jones, Can Internet Companies Monitor Terrorists?, BBC 
NEWS (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30208602 
[https://perma.cc/E2W3-4XGZ]. 
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internet, facilitates the spread of terrorist speech, unrestricted by the 
most popular social media sites. 
i. Social Media Platform’s Global Reach Attracts Terrorist 
Organizations Seeking to Spread Their Message and Shape Their 
Perception In the World. 
Social media’s global influence provides an attractive avenue for 
ISIS to facilitate their ideological goals. Foreign terrorist fighters flock 
from over 100 countries to fight with ISIS, al-Qaeda, or an affiliate.33 
Sally Jones, from the United Kingdom, was one such fighter.34 Jones 
went to Syria to marry an ISIS member and became active in the 
recruitment of other young girls to become “jihadi brides” and marry 
other ISIS members.35 Twenty Twitter accounts linked to her 
information expressed support for ISIS.36 Recruitment to the Middle 
East, however, is only part of the global influence ISIS wields.37 The 
call issued by clerics and Islamist leaders like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and Osama Bin Laden incited violence 
across the globe.38 In questioning how the Boston Marathon Bombing 
by the Tsarnaev brothers came about, investigators found jihadist 
writings, al-Qaeda propaganda, as well as YouTube videos of speeches 
by radical clerics on one of the brother’s computers.39 Similarly, in 
December 2017, a U.S. district court sentenced a Massachusetts man 
to 28 years in prison for supporting ISIS and using a Twitter page for 
the “Lions of America” to call on his followers to kill Americans.40 
 
33. 9/11 Memorial & Museum, supra note 8. 
34. Tara John, Sally Jones, The ISIS ‘White Widow’, Believed Killed in 




37. See Ann O’Neill, The 13th Juror: The Radicalization of Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev, CNN (Mar. 30, 2015, 4:17 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/27/us/tsarnaev-13th-juror-jahar-
radicalization/index.html [https://perma. cc/UY5B-EYZQ] (noting the 
radicalization of US immigrants through social media). 
38. Scott Shane, Zarqawi Built Global Jihadist Network on Internet, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 9, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/09/world/middleeast/09web.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z4K2-RJBT]. 
39. O’Neill, supra note 37.  
40. Office of Public Affairs, Massachusetts Man Sentenced to 28 Years in 
Prison for Supporting ISIS and Conspiring to Murder U.S. Citizens, 
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These incidents demonstrate the role of social media as a global 
resource—facilitating terrorist activity by publishing content for 
incitement and recruitment for violent actions.41 Far beyond the 
physical presence of ISIS in the Middle East, social media serves to 
magnify ISIS’s ideology. 
ii. The Ease of Access Many Social Media Platforms Have Creates a 
Unique Environment for Terrorist Organizations to Exploit, Constantly 
Reappearing Even After Removal. 
Social media also attracts terrorist content due to the ease at 
which those associated with the organizations can access the 
platforms. To create a Twitter account, an individual only needs to 
provide a name, phone number or e-mail, and create a password.42 
Facebook requires the same information, in addition to a birth date.43 
In turn, internet-based e-mail accounts, such as Gmail and Yahoo, 
also require minimal information to set up, typically only a phone 
number and birth date.44 Such ease of access creates few, if any, 
barriers to individuals creating multiple accounts, further 
complicating the issue.45 The ease of rejoining Twitter after an 
account suspension or creating multiple Facebook accounts means 
eliminating users is ultimately only a delay in—not a denial of—the 
posting of terrorist content.46 Because of this simplicity, the 
environment generated by social media platforms welcomes those 
 
41. See Office of Public Affairs, supra note 37; see also O’Neill, supra note 
34 (noting the use of social media to publish content recruiting for and 
incitement to violence). 
42. TWITTER, https://twitter.com/i/flow/signup?lang=en (last visited Mar. 
21, 2018). 
43. How to Join Facebook, DIGITAL UNITE, 
https://www.digitalunite.com/technology-guides/social-networking-
blogs/facebook/how-join-facebook [https://perma.cc/6QR3-KU29 ] (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2018). 
44. How to Create a New Yahoo Email Account, http://www.ptci.net/wp-
content/uploads/Yahoo-Email-Account.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM3C-
QBXM] (last visited Mar. 21, 2018); see also Setting Up a Gmail 
Account, GCF GLOBAL, 
https://www.gcflearnfree.org/print/gmail/setting-up-a-gmail-
account?playlist=Gmail (last visited Mar. 21, 2018). 
45. See Cellan-Jones, supra note 32 (discussing how a terrorist supporter 
used multiple accounts, despite prohibitions against having multiple 
accounts on social media networks). 
46. Laura Huey, This is Not Your Mother’s Terrorism: Social Media, 
Online Radicalization and the Practice of Political Jamming, 6 J. 
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attempting to spread an unwelcome message. Hostile messages, 
although perhaps in name disowned, in reality face few roadblocks to 
reappearing on the platforms. 
iii. Social Media’s Constant Evolution Makes an Environment Open to 
Abuse by Terrorist Organizations as They Quickly Gain Access and 
Recreate Their Perception for Each New Platform. 
The internet’s evolving nature makes it an environment ripe for 
abuse as ISIS seeks new, unregulated means of spreading its message. 
Just over the past decade, the internet has changed dramatically.47 
From the launch of the iPhone in 2007,48 to Facebook’s billionth user 
in 2012,49 and new interactive content,50 the internet bears limited 
resemblance to the worldwide web introduced in 1990.51 Social media, 
likewise, has undergone dramatic changes from the early time of 
AOL52 and Myspace.53 Since that time, social media platforms such as 
YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and others, have allowed 
users to take part in the ever-expanding worldwide web, generating 
content and creating a new type of connectedness between people.54 
 
47. Grace Reader, 11 Big Changes to the Internet from the Past Decade, 
ENTREPRENEUR (July 28, 2016), 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/279844 [perma.cc/C5UQ-UYD7].  
48. Rene Ritchie, 11 Years Ago Today, Steve Jobs Introduced the iPhone, 
IMORE (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.imore.com/history-iphone-original 
[perma.cc/VNQ3-3TVB]. 
49. Aaron Smith, Laurie Segall, & Stacy Cowley, Facebook Reaches One 
Billion Users, CNNTECH (Oct. 4, 2012, 9:50 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/04/technology/facebook-billion-
users/index.html [perma.cc/56ZN-439Q]. 
50. See Chirag Kulkarni, 11 Ways Social Media Will Evolve in the Future, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/293454 [https://perma.cc/N8BG-
LBYL] (enumerating how social media has evolved to connect people 
and offer new online mediums). 
51. Evan Andrews, Who Invented the Internet?, HISTORY (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://www.history.com/news/ask-history/who-invented-the-internet 
[https://perma.cc/2AQ6-ZC4S]. 
52. Julia Sklar, AOL Instant Messenger Made Social Media What It Is 
Today, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609769/aol-instant-messenger-
made-social-media-what-it-is-today/ [https://perma.cc/J547-UB9Y]. 
53. Then and Now: A History of Social Networking Sites, CBS NEWS, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/then-and-now-a-history-of-social-
networking-sites/7/ [https://perma.cc/R6GT-PE8W]. 
54. Lees Rainie et al., The Strength of Internet Ties, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER INTERNET & TECHNOLOGY (Jan. 25, 2006), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2006/01/25/the-strength-of-internet-ties/ 
[https://perma.cc/H9DJ-EHEF]. 
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Terrorist organizations take advantage of these evolving 
networking opportunities, adapting their message to new cultural 
trends.55 Via social media, ISIS uses pop culture references to lure in 
younger generations and change the way they view the organization 
and its goals, a technique known as “jihadi cool.”56 Described as a 
“new hipster pop-jihadism,” jihadi cool accentuates the new “brand” 
of jihad.57 As EUROPOL notes:  
The religious component in recruitment and radicalization is 
being replaced by more social elements such as peer pressure 
and role modelling. Additionally, the romantic prospects of 
being part of an important and exciting development, apart 
from more private considerations, may play a role. Suicide 
bombers see themselves more as heroes than as religious 
martyrs.58 
Terrorist organizations also manipulate media in an effort to draw 
attention to themselves, such as using a picture of German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel with a refugee and connecting the refugee to 
terrorism.59 A study by the Brookings Institute found that, in an 
effort to increase viewership, 40 percent of ISIS’s videos included 
“cultural images of modernity in order to promote a political project 
based on anti-modern values.”60 The constantly-evolving nature of 
social media and pop culture creates an opportunity for ISIS to 
infiltrate the platforms and use current trends to aid in the spread of 
their content. 
 
55. Huey, supra note 46, at 1. 
56. Id. 
57. Kurt Eichenwald, Jihadi Cool: Belgium’s New Extremists are as Shallow 
as They are Deadly, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 22, 2018), 
https://www.newsweek.com/2016/04/08/belgium-new-extremists-jihadi-
cool-brussels-attacks-439640.html [https://perma.cc/9YCQ-S384]. 
58. Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State Terrorist Attacks, 
EUROPOL 3 (Jan. 18, 2016), available at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/changes-in-
modus-operandi-of-islamic-state-terrorists-attacks.  
59. Melissa Eddy, How a Refugee’s Selfie With Merkel Led to a Facebook 
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/business/syria-refugee-anas-
modamani-germany-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/PZD3-7MLR]. 
60. Javier Lesaca, On Social Media, ISIS Uses Modern Cultural Images to 
Spread Anti-Modern Values, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: TECHTANK 
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2. Current Government Responses Fail to Effectively Address the 
Appeal of Social Media for Terrorist Organizations and Their Presence on 
Various Platforms. 
Despite the numerous angles and tactics employed to combat 
ISIS’s use of social media, social media companies and government 
entities have failed to construct effective means of reducing its 
presence online.61 This failure stems from two underlying concerns 
unaddressed by the entities’ efforts, namely the long-term threat 
posed by ideologies like ISIS’s and jurisdictional gaps in coverage. 
Current efforts support only short-term solutions to a long-term 
problem thereby promoting inefficiency. Resource limitations further 
exacerbate this problem. Similarly, jurisdiction-based responses fail to 
appreciate the global nature of Islamic extremism. With these various 
limitations, current solutions cannot achieve a meaningful barrier to 
terrorist content. 
i. Short-term Solutions Typify Social Media Companies’ and 
Government Entities’ Responses, Ignoring the Long-Term Ideological and 
Methodological Threat Posed by ISIS’s Example. 
Limited responses with a short-term perspective plague current 
approaches to terrorists’ exploitation of social media. Without fully 
appreciating the expansive threat posed by radical Islamic ideologies 
and the powerful tool social media companies have placed in the 
hands of the ordinary people, those responding to the threat present 
flawed solutions.62 The possibility for future terrorist organizations to 
develop from ISIS, when considered in light of the limitations faced by 
current responses both in terms of software and resources, highlights 
the challenge faced by those tasked with reducing the threat posed by 
terrorist content on social media.63 
National governments focus their solutions on addressing the 
threats here-and-now, overlooking the long-term ideological and 
methodological threats posed by the current use of social media by 
ISIS. Just as ISIS developed from the foundation laid by al-Qaeda, so 
too could the next major terrorist threat to global safety and 
 
61. Patrikarakos, supra note 9. 
62. See Bruce Hoffman, INSIDE TERRORISM 214-220 (2006) (noting the 
difficulty those combating terrorism may have in identifying the 
religious motivations of terrorist groups). 
63. See Assaf Baciu, Artificial Intelligence is More Artificial Than 
Intelligent, WIRED (Dec. 7, 2016, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/12/artificial-intelligence-artificial-
intelligent/ [https://perma.cc/9Z29-PCWM] (noting the challenges 
facing the development of truly effective artificial intelligence programs). 
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security.64 In his cultural history of terrorism, Michael Burleigh 
follows the trends of Islamic terrorism starting in the late 1970s, 
noting the combination of religious enthusiasm and secondary events 
which spurred increased terrorist activity.65 Such trends can easily 
continue into the future. For example, Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-
Shabaab in Somalia, both originally affiliated with al-Qaeda, have 
pledged allegiance to ISIS.66 Each holds the same ideological goals of 
establishing a caliphate and, based on the attacks each has committed 
on the citizens of their “home” countries, appears to accept ISIS’s 
perspective on violence as well.67 Should these two organizations seek 
to develop a larger international presence, they would likely look to 
ISIS’s use of social media as an example. 
Similarly, terrorist organizations do not copyright or trademark 
their tactics—they may freely develop off the “successes” of others. 
Terrorist organizations can take, develop, and manipulate the 
methods of violence previously used by others to fit their needs.68 As 
such, the use of one tactic by an organization can quickly spread to 
others, even if they do not share ideological similarities.69 
The development of suicide bombings as a means of terrorist 
attack demonstrates the auxiliary nature of shared ideological fervor.70 
Suicide bombing, according to historian Jeffrey Lewis, developed 
along-side the creation of dynamite.71 Prior to the Russian Revolution, 
one radical held the dynamite while approaching the czar, not 
detonating until close enough to kill them both.72 The Japanese  
64. See Michael Burleigh, BLOOD AND RAGE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF 
TERRORISM 346 (2009) (noting the pattern of Islamic terrorism and its 
development off of trends formed in the Middle Ages). 
65. Id. 
66. Holly Yan, Not Just ISIS: Terror Groups Worldwide Jockey for Power, 
CNN (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/04/world/non-isis-
terror-groups-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/5WMH-2KCT]; see 
also Robyn Kriel & Briana Duggan, Al-Shabaab Faction Pledges 
Allegiance to ISIS, CNN (Oct. 23, 2015, 3:37 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/22/africa/al-shabaab-faction-
isis/index.html [https://perma.cc/UE4H-VA5V]. 
67. Yan, supra note 66. 
68. See Jeffrey William Lewis, The Human Use of Human Beings: A Brief 
History of Suicide Bombing, 6 ORIGINS: CURRENT EVENTS HIST. PERS. 
(2013), http://origins.osu.edu/article/human-use-human-beings-brief-
history-suicide-bombing [https://perma.cc/L497-TTAX] (noting the 
spread of the concept of suicide bombing from imperial Russia, to 
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adopted this approach for the Kamikazes in World War II.73 
Hezbollah in the 1980s generated the type of suicide bombing typical 
of today, using the tactic against U.S. military installations.74 This 
form of development presents a problem for national governments’ 
current responses. No international database of terrorist methods 
exists.75 National governments tend to focus on those threats most 
concerning to them in the present or near future, as evidenced by 
their special designations of “terrorist organizations.”76 Relying on 
restricted perspectives and lack of appreciation for the long-term 
ideological and methodological threat stemming from ISIS’s example, 
counterterrorism efforts will necessarily have limited prospective 
impact. 
Limitations in technology used to identify and eliminate terrorist 
content further compounds the failings created by a short-term 
perspective. Social media companies, especially Facebook, rely on 
artificial intelligence software to identify content that infringes on 
copyrights or contains child pornography.77 More recently, companies 
have tried to alter the algorithms to identify extremist images or 
language and delete the accounts created by banned users.78 Through 
such tools, Twitter removed nearly 300,000 accounts linked to 
terrorism.79 Terrorist content, however, is far more likely to be used in 




75. See Stefan Stieglitz et al., Social Media Analytics – Challenges in Topic 
Discovery, Data Collection, and Data Preparation, 39 INT’L J. INFO. 
MGMT. 156, 161-65 (2018) (noting the “newness” of social media 
analytics and the challenges in synthesizing “big data,” namely volume, 
relevancy, storage requirements, formatting, and the structuring the 
information). 
76. Statewatch Comparative Analysis of the US, UK, UN and EU “Terrorist 
Lists,” STATEWATCH.ORG, 
http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/listsbground.html 
[https://perma.cc/C4NC-PD9T] (last visited Mar. 21, 2018); see also 
List of Groups Designated Terrorist Organisations by the UAE, THE 




77. Emily Dreyfuss, Facebook’s Counterterrorism Playbook Comes Into 
Focus, WIRED (June 17, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-
counterterrorism/ [https://perma.cc/QTB2-TFSA]. 
78. Id. 
79. Adam Satariano, Twitter Suspends 300,000 Accounts Tied to Terrorism 
in 2017, BLOOMBERG TECHNOLOGY (Sept. 19, 2017, 10:33 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-19/twitter-
suspends-300-000-accounts-in-2017-for-terrorism-content. 
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contextual distinction difficult for computer programs to accurately 
determine.80 For example, in 2011, a French teacher sued Facebook 
for removing a picture he posted of a piece of artwork by Gustave 
Courbet, on the grounds that the work depicting a naked woman was 
art, not explicit material.81 
Relying on artificial intelligence to make such contextual 
distinctions undermines the full effectiveness of the algorithms as 
mathematical calculations struggle to make the determination.82 As 
one author notes, only through “human hand-holding” and years of 
training do machines like IBM’s Watson win against Jeopardy 
greats.83 The years necessary to hone the technology to address 
specific content fails to effectively counter the evolving nature of 
terrorist organizations. Altering programs to perform at the level 
necessary takes time—time which works in terrorist’s favor. 
National governments’ offensive efforts likewise demonstrate their 
short-sighted perspective on the distribution and use of limited 
resources. The U.S., for example, produces counter-propaganda to 
dilute the influence of ISIS publications.84 During 2013-2014, the State 
Department published over 300 videos on YouTube to specifically 
counter ISIS, the most popular video having 120,000 views.85 On 
Twitter, the U.S. operates six different accounts for this purpose.86 
These posts, however, face an uphill battle. Not only do they miss the 
long-term threat from future terrorist organizations who may adopt 
ISIS’s example,87 they must also gain attention in the overwhelming 
 
80. See Heidi Glenn, How Facebook Uses Technology To Block Terrorist-
Related Content, NPR (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/06/22/533855547
/how-facebook-uses-technology-to-block-terrorist-related-content 
[https://perma.cc/FJ76-B37C] (discussing anecdotes where Facebook’s 
algorithms have flagged news content and employees restored the 
content after reviewing it themselves).   
81. Vivienne Walt, Why a French Court Could Disrupt Facebook’s Global 
Ambitions, TIME (May 21, 2015), http://time.com/3892097/facebook-
jurisdiction-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/4M7K-QRFB]. 
82. See Baciu, supra note 63 (describing A.I.’s continued reliance on 
humans for context-based determinations). 
83. Id. 
84. Javier Lesaca, Fight Against ISIS Reveals Power of Social Media, THE 





87. See Kriel & Duggan, supra note 66 (reporting an Al Shabaab faction’s 
declaration of allegiance to ISIS). 
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sea of social media content. Such counter-narratives must fight for 
influence amongst the 6,000 tweets made per second.88 Not only must 
the counter-propaganda reach those same individuals targeted by ISIS 
to be truly effective, but they must attempt to do so amidst a 
staggering amount of other material. Even videos face a battle as 
YouTube estimates that users upload 48 hours of content every 
minute, accumulating to eight years of content a day.89 
Additionally, these efforts do little to groups like ISIS who do not 
care about local, popular support and have the sheer quantity of user-
generated content on their side.90 Providing a counter-narrative 
undoubtedly contributes to the disruption of ISIS’s presence on 
platforms. Such counter-propaganda, however, challenges a narrative 
ISIS cares little about as evidenced by the treatment of those in 
Raqqa.91 Instead of using these social media resources to generate 
fewer but more impactful posts or to head-off developing terrorist 
organizations, the best counter-propaganda comes from those with 
likely even fewer resources. Footage leaked by a Kurdish media 
network showed the rescue of ISIS-held, Kurdish prisoners.92 That 
video received 1.2 million views in five days.93 Lacking analytics to see 
the trends in terrorist organizations and their tactics across platforms 
and nations,94 social media companies’ and national governments’ 
work gets only a portion of the overall picture, or ends up drowning 
in an crushing amount of user content unable to have a truly effective 
response. 
ii. Reliance on National Regulations to Combat Terrorist Content on 
Social Media Creates Gaps in Coverage Exploitable by Terrorist 
Organizations. 
Jurisdictional and treaty gaps additionally plague the ability of 
those combatting terrorism to do so effectively. Conflicts of 
jurisdiction arise as each nation attempts to address the threat in its 
own way. These conflicts stem from a variety of factors, including 
 
88. INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-
statistics/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/26J5-PTV7]. 
89. U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS AND CRIME, THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR 
TERRORIST PURPOSES 126 (2012), 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Te
rrorist_Purposes.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLL3-XSQB]. 
90. World Affairs, William McCants: The ISIS Apocalypse, YOUTUBE (Dec. 
21, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kur-qWNkzng 
[https://perma.cc/52YP-8JFT]. 
91. Lesaca, supra note 84; see also The Raqqa Diaries, supra note 20. 
92. Lesaca, supra note 85. 
93. Id. 
94. See Stieglitz et al., supra note 75. 
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each nation’s different regulatory schemes and the international 
community’s lack of a comprehensive response, resulting in the 
absence of a universal standard underlying jurisdictional differences. 
Without uniformity at either the national or international level, 
terrorist organizations will be quick to exploit any gaps in coverage 
they discover. 
At its core, the nature of terrorism alters the stakes at issue when 
discussing terrorist content on social media, limiting the effectiveness 
of purely national responses. Unlike crimes which occur wholly within 
one jurisdiction, the spread of terrorist content across social media 
absorbs the characteristics of terrorism and cybercrimes, generating a 
transnational conflict.95 According to the U.S. Director of National 
Intelligence, cyber instability poses a growing threat to international 
security, rivaling terrorism, organized crime, and weapons of mass 
destruction.96 Given this threat, national governments seek better 
responses to terrorist organizations’ use of social media, but 
conflicting regulatory measures fail to create an effective obstacle to 
the influence wielded online. For example, both France and Germany 
have proposed regulations for social media companies for the content 
posted on their platforms.97 Germany proposed to fine the companies 
for any hate speech not removed within 24 hours.98 France, in 
comparison, proposed a regulation requiring platforms to reveal 
sponsored content or the government would block internet access to 
their platform.99 Such differences in regulations create hurdles for the 
companies to comply with and potentially cause jurisdictions to 
become safe harbors for terrorist content because of lax or non-
 
95. Catherine Lotrionte, Symposium: International Law and the Internet: 
Adapting Legal Frameworks in Response to Online Warfare and 
Revolutions Fueled by Social Media: State Sovereignty and Self-Defense 
in Cyberspace: A Normative Framework for Balancing Legal Rights, 25 
EMORY INT’L. REV. 825, 828 (2012). 
96. See generally OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L SEC., WORLDWIDE THREAT 
ASSESSMENT OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (2018) (addressing 
the threats of cybercrime, weapons of mass destruction, and organized 
crime). 
97. Janet Burns, Germany To Social Media Sites: Remove Hate Speech in 
24 Hours or Face $57 Million Fines, FORBES (Jun. 30, 2017, 7:36 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2017/06/30/germany-now-
allows-up-to-57m-in-fines-if-facebook-doesnt-remove-hate-speech-
fast/#1f56b45d761d [https://perma.cc/FB9M-PPLE]; see also Jean 
Baptiste Su, France To Impose Restrictions on Facebook, Twitter In 
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existent regulations on an issue.100 Because regulation through 
national jurisdictions promotes gaps and variances in coverage, 
international law offers a comprehensive alternative. 
Current international law, however, fails to take more than a 
patchwork approach to addressing the impact of terrorist content.101 
International treaties and agreements make few, if any, references to 
cyberattacks or terrorist publications.102 Rather than comprehensive 
coverage, the treaties approach terrorism in a piecemeal fashion, each 
addressing a specific type of terrorism or aspect of its spread.103 
Further, the lack of a universal definition of “terrorism” inhibits the 
international community’s ability to create a more comprehensive 
agreement.104 The U.N. Security Council’s resolutions cover more of 
the threats, including cyberattacks, but maintain the patchwork 
limitations.105 Resolutions and reports, however, pose no binding 
authority on state action.106 Without a means of enforcement against 
states, many international law resolutions or agreements remain 
recommendations for state behavior rather than impactful laws 
addressing a global security issue.107 This lack of consensus results in 
 
100. See U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 86, at ¶ 91 
(discussing the lack of a universal instrument addressing terrorist 
activity online and providing guidance on the criminalization, 
investigation, and prosecution of terrorist cases involving the internet). 
101. See U.N. OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM, International Legal 
Instruments, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/legal-
instruments.shtml [https://perma.cc/9LJ8-LQF4] (last visited Mar. 21, 
2018) (recognizing the 19 international counter-terrorism instruments 
and each document’s individual focus). 
102. Lotrionte, supra note 95, at 905-06. 
103. See U.N. OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 94 (reciting the 
key General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and their 
targeted application). 
104. ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 4 (2002). 
105. David P. Fidler, Cyberspace, Terrorism and International Law, 21 J. 
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 475, 478-79 (2016). 
106. See U.N. Security Council, Functions and Powers, UN.ORG, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.shtml (lists functions as 
suggestions and recommendations but does not include methods of 
enforcement upon individual state action); see also Marko Divac Oberg, 
The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and 
General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
879, 883 (2006) (discussing binding effects of General Assembly actions). 
107. See Are UN Resolutions Binding?, DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY, 
http://ask.un.org/faq/15010 (last visited Mar. 21, 2018) (lists examples 
of resolutions and discusses how the nature of resolutions determines the 
extent to which they are binding on States); see also Oberg, supra note 
103. 
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nothing more than suggestions for states to follow, with no impact on 
states’ actions and maintaining the regulatory gaps. 
Social media’s role in facilitating terrorist content raises the 
question of social media companies’ responsibilities for self-censoring 
posts that recruit for or incite violence. Throughout the U.S. and 
Europe, individuals have filed civil legal claims against social media 
companies for their role in facilitating and/or radicalizing terrorists.108 
Twitter, specifically, faces legal claims from families of the victims of 
the ISIS terror attacks in Paris and Brussels.109 The families argue 
that Twitter aided and abetted ISIS before, during, and after the 
attacks; they allege that “among social media platforms, Twitter has 
been the most stubborn one to refuse to cut off its service to 
terrorists, taking the position that ‘the tweets must flow,’ even if it 
means assisting in mass murder.”110 A Dallas police officer injured in 
the 2016 shooting filed a claim against Facebook, Google, and Twitter 
alleging the same concerns.111 But for the use of these platforms, 
according to the officer, the attacker would not have shot at the 
police.112 German courts heard a similar case against Facebook 
brought by the refugee whose picture with Chancellor Merkel was 
manipulated by terrorist organizations.113 Though these cases have yet 
to hold social media companies liable, they demonstrate the judicial 
system’s openness to holding social media companies responsible for 
their role in facilitating terrorist violence. 
 
108. Nina Iacono Brown, Should Social Media Networks Be Held Liable for 
Terrorism?, SLATE (June 16, 2017, 7:14 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/06/a_ne
w_legal_theory_for_holding_social_networks_liable_for_terrorism.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/8UYG-W7GK]; see also Eddy, supra note 59. 
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III. Social Media Companies Should Be Held Liable for 
Aiding and Abetting Terrorist Organizations When 
They Knowingly Permit Terrorist Speech to Remain 
on Their Platforms. 
 
Without a redirection of incentives, few long-term barriers to 
terrorist content on social media platforms will develop. Utilizing a 
narrow definition of prohibited “terrorist speech,” enforced through 
national criminal justice systems, social media companies should now 
be held liable for aiding and abetting terrorism. The combination of 
an international aiding and abetting standard and a universal 
definition of “terrorist speech” counters the commercial incentives, 
enabling companies to self-regulate and avoid liability. Having social 
media companies take responsibility for knowingly permitting the 
most dangerous forms of “terrorist speech” to remain on their 
platforms after notification refutes social media companies’ incentives. 
If the companies fail to respond, however, a means of imposing 
punishment is available. Joint implementation through both 
international monitoring and national enforcement provides a means 
of holding companies responsible and further counters the incentives 
towards short-term, ineffective solutions. 
A. A Limited Definition of “Terrorist Speech” In Conjunction with the 
Use of An International Aiding and Abetting Standard Best Facilitates 
Holding Social Media Companies Responsible for Terrorist Content. 
 
1. Limiting the Scope of Liability by Narrowly Defining What Type of 
Speech and Whose Speech Can Create Liability for Social Media 
Companies Protects Free Expression While Providing a Means of Self-
Censorship to Companies. 
Prior to any discussion of liability, a clear articulation of what 
content creates liability is necessary. To formulate a definition of 
what type of speech should justify liability, a careful balance must be 
struck between national security concerns and free expression.114 The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights codified the 
principles of freedom of expression in Article 19, stating that,  
 
114. See Marne Levine, Controversial, Harmful and Hateful Speech on 
Facebook, FACEBOOK (May 28, 2013, 4:51 PM), 
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-safety/controversial-harmful-
and-hateful-speech-on-facebook/574430655911054/ 
[https://perma.cc/P3WS-WQ6B] (commenting on the balance Facebook 
has sought to strike between identifying harmful content and freedom of 
expression). 
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“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this 
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his choice.”115  
It recognizes, however, that such freedom is subject to restriction 
when necessary to protect the rights of others or for the protection of 
national security or public order.116 U.S. law also recognizes this 
principle in the Supreme Court case Brandenburg v. Ohio, which 
prohibits speech that “is directed to inciting or producing such 
imminent lawless [i.e., violent] action that is likely to incite or 
produce such action.”117 Similarly, international treaties have not 
protected “speech likely to incite violence or recruit[e] others for the 
incitement of violence.” 118 Defining “terrorist speech” within the 
confines of the Brandenburg test would severely limit the speech in 
question and subject to prosecution. Terrorist organizations, despite 
their flaws, could still peacefully advocate for their views and would 
only have a restriction placed on their speech when used in a manner 
to threaten national security and public safety through their advocacy 
of violent action. Through this limited restriction, disagreement and 
dissent can flourish while violence and participation in terrorism faces 
a barrier. 
In addition to restricting what form of speech would trigger 
liability, whose speech creates liability should also be determined. 
National and international bodies already provide a means of 
determining what “terrorist” expressions should be targeted. The 
United States, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, European 
Union, and the United Nations all have “terrorist lists” which identify 
the scope and legal effect of being designated as a “terrorist 
organization.”119 Though these designations vary in whether they 
identify only groups or groups and individuals, each symbolizes the 
nations’ concerns—concerns which flow into the online  environment 
with every post containing terrorist speech. Using these lists in each 
respective country for the identification of “terrorist speech” 
 
115. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, ¶ 2, 
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976). 
116. Id. 
117. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
118. See International Covenant, supra note 112 (regarding the art. 19 
language on restrictions to the right to expression to protect national 
security or public order). 
119. Statewatch Comparative Analysis of the US, UK, UN and EU “Terrorist 
Lists,” supra note 76; see also List of Groups Designated Terrorist 
Organizations by the UAE, supra note 76. 
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eliminates the struggles witnessed in international law for 
implementing a universal “terrorism” definition.120 Government 
entities and social media companies’ failure to create effective 
restrictions on their own necessitates alternatives—alternatives which 
change the incentives at play between terrorist organizations, social 
media companies, and government entities. Respecting the Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, a limited understanding of both 
“terrorist” and “speech” provides a clear distinction of whose and 
what speech social media companies should be held responsible for, 
striking an importance balance between national security and free 
expression. 
2. Social Media Companies’ Failure to Act is Most Analogous to 
Aiding and Abetting, Making it the Best Means of Imposing Liability in 
Domestic Courts. 
Imposing responsibility on social media companies punishes their 
hesitation to self-censor and the facilitation of terrorist activity which 
follows. Aiding and abetting provides the best conduit for 
implementing liability against social media companies because it 
focuses on the “facilitation” role their lack of self-censorship plays in 
the promotion of ISIS’s content. In the United States, the aiding and 
abetting statute reads as follows: 
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or 
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its 
commission, is punishable as a principal.  
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly 
performed by him or another would be an offense against the 
United States, is punishable as a principal.121 
Under this code section, aiding and abetting has constituted 
participating in an armed drug deal,122 assisting an officer of the 
Internal Revenue Service receive more compensation than authorized 
by law,123 and possessing heroin with the intent to distribute.124 
Statutes such as this provide the best path for imposing liability 
because they recognize that, though the companies have not posted 
the content themselves, they bear a responsibility for their role in 
facilitating the recruitment for or incitement to violence called for in 
terrorist speech.  
120. See Dershowitz, supra note 104 (discussing the struggle to create a 
universal definition of terrorism). 
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
122. Rosemond v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2013). 
123. Standefer v. U.S., 477 U.S. 10 (1980). 
124. U.S. v. Garcia, 752 F.3d 382 (2014). 
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In essence, holding social media companies responsible through 
aiding and abetting would copy the changes made in the U.S. for the 
Communications Decency Act.125 Introduced in 2017 and signed into 
law in April 2018, the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sext 
Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA) reduces the protections in Section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act.126 Previously, Section 230 
does not impose liability on intermediary websites for sex trafficking-
related content posted by others; FOSTA withdraws this immunity 
for internet companies which permit content that facilitates sex 
trafficking.127 The Senate Commerce Committee’s report on SESTA128 
cited a lawsuit alleging that the website Backpage.com facilitated sex 
trafficking through its online classified advertising in the “Adult 
Entertainment” category.129 Plaintiffs alleged that because the website 
had few verification procedures and allowed workarounds, such as 
restricting posts containing the words “barely legal” but not “brly 
legal,” the website’s “rules and processes governing the content of 
advertisements are designed to encourage sex trafficking.”130 The same 
workarounds are available through social media companies’ 
procedures. As mentioned previously, platforms have few, if any, real 
restrictions on the replication of previously-banned accounts, and 
artificial intelligence struggles to identify terrorist speech.131 Because 
of these similarities, liability should also be imposed on social media 
 
125. See Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017, S. 1693, 115th Cong. 
(2018) (imposing liability on third parties by altering the 
Communications Decency Act), available at 
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companies who fail to take down content after becoming aware of its 
existence. Connecting the idea of third-party liability provided by 
SESTA with the responsibility for “facilitation” imposed through 
aiding and abetting constructs a means of holding social media 
companies responsible for the terrorist speech spread through the 
platforms they control. 
3. Using an Aiding and Abetting Standard Based in Customary 
International Law Creates the Strongest, Most Comprehensive 
Foundation for Liability. 
Relying on customary international law as the basis for the aiding 
and abetting standard provides the easiest foundation for universal 
acceptance and application in national jurisdictions. Customary 
international law reflects those routine state practices that have 
become so prominent and accepted within the international 
community as to constitute a legal obligation, such as the immunity 
granted ambassadors of foreign countries.132 The concept of aiding and 
abetting already holds a place in customary international law. 133 
Countries from a wide variety of legal and cultural backgrounds 
already accept the premise of aiding and abetting liability.134 In its 
extensive study on the principles of international customary 
humanitarian law, the International Committee for the Red Cross 
found the law included that “[n]o one may be convicted of an offence 
except on the basis of individual criminal responsibility,” with 
“individual criminal responsibility” including facilitating, aiding, or 
abetting the commission of a crime.135 A subsequent rule of customary 
international law finds that all parties to a conflict, whether 
international or domestic armed conflicts, have an obligation to 
respect customary international law.136 This legal obligation and 
widespread use already by many national governments provides a 
simply means of integrating liability into established legal systems 
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and encouraging adoption across the global—simultaneously creating 
a more comprehensive barrier to terrorist speech on social media.137  
Using customary international law entails the expansion of 
existing state practice to impose liability and incentivize the 
elimination of terrorist speech—it requires no new law or concept of 
responsibility. In her article, Catherine Lotrionte, former Assistant 
General Counsel at the CIA, calls for the international community to 
apply preexisting customary international law rules for war to cyber-
attacks. 138 This would not require a “reinvention” of current law, but 
rather would address how current international norms about state 
behavior apply to cyberspace.139 The Fafo Institute in the Netherlands 
conducted a survey of sixteen countries from around the globe asking 
whether the countries had statutes imposing liability on corporations 
for being complicit in a crime.140 Though not every country applied 
the laws to corporations, every country had some form of liability 
based on knowingly helping the commission of a crime.141 Founded on 
state practice, the international community can generate a sufficiently 
concrete definition of aiding and abetting mimicking Lotrionte’s 
suggestion for cyberspace but applying to terrorist speech.142 Applying 
this logic forces the international community to generate a long-term 
solution for the problem they have thus far only approached in a 
patchwork fashion. 
B. Joint Implementation Through INTERPOL’s Existing Resources 
and National Judicial Systems Provides the Best of International and 
National Systems for Combatting Terrorist Speech. 
 
Nations can impose liability through the international standard 
on social media platforms should they fail to remove terrorist speech. 
In a joint effort by nations and INTERPOL, platforms receive more 
monitoring and better enforcement for the removal of content. 
Working with each nations’ existing designations of terrorist 
organizations, INTERPOL’s intelligence and information sharing 
systems can implement monitoring specific to each jurisdiction’s 
designations, while maintaining a “bird’s eye view” for the 
development of international trends.143 After the identification of 
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terrorist speech, INTERPOL will notify the social media companies of 
the content, making them aware of its presence and need for removal. 
Should social media companies remove the content, the system 
continues, and the threat posed by such speech is reduced. If they do 
not remove it, however, national judicial systems may step in and 
impose liability through the judicial systems, simultaneously 
providing an appeals process for any misidentification or contextual 
ambiguity. Dividing enforcement between national jurisdictions and 
INTERPOL provides for the strongest comprehensive solution to 
terrorist speech, while recognizing and working within jurisdictional 
and cultural differences. 
The limited definition of “terrorist speech” in turn restricts the 
scope of INTERPOL’s notifications and monitoring, focusing it on the 
content produced by terrorist organizations of specific concern to each 
nation. Created in 1923, the International Criminal Police 
Commission, changing its name to INTERPOL in 1956, aims to 
support the policemen and women of its 192 member states in both 
domestic and international cooperative efforts.144 Every INTERPOL 
member country has a National Central Bureau linking national 
police forces with international efforts.145 As part of its work regarding 
terrorism, INTERPOL created two databases, MIND and FIND, to 
facilitate information-sharing between countries, specifically aiding 
states in screening people and travel documents at border crossings in 
order to help identify terrorists, fugitives, and lost or stolen travel 
documents.146 A similar database could facilitate the efforts to combat 
terrorist speech.  
Providing consistent monitoring through INTERPOL increases 
the likelihood of terrorist speech and trends in such speech being 
found and removed quickly before they can take root on platforms.147 
Utilizing INTERPOL’s existing information-sharing systems while 
having National Central Bureau’s focus on the specific terrorist 
organizations of concern to the nation allows the system to function 
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with the best of both international and national resources.148 Through 
the National Central Bureau’s connection to INTERPOL, monitoring 
is no longer an isolated activity of each state. Rather, monitoring 
takes place as part of a global effort to identify new terrorist trends, 
while each bureau’s monitoring and notification respects national 
sovereignty through its use of national terrorist designations. 
Once the monitoring identifies terrorist speech, INTERPOL may 
notify social media companies or national law enforcement about its 
existence. INTERPOL’s system of notices provides an example of how 
such communication may occur.149 “Notices” constitute one of the 
main methods of international information-sharing facilitated by 
INTERPOL; through them, the international community may assist 
or is made aware of important crime-related information.150 These 
notices undergo a rigorous screening process prior to issuing, including 
limitations on the nature of the activities which can receive notices 
and screening of information through INTERPOL’s Rules on the 
Processing of Data which ensures sufficient substantiation of 
notices.151 Many of the hurdles this process creates for the issuance of 
a notice for criminals, missing persons, or similarly serious crimes, do 
not pose barriers for the identification of terrorist speech because of 
the nation’s role in designating the terrorist organizations. Should 
nations wish a more stringent screening of the notices sent by 
INTEPROL to social media companies, however, each National 
Central Bureau could include those procedures or national law 
enforcement could personally review the would-be notices prior to 
issuing them to companies. On the whole, such notifications would 
include information relevant to the social media company for 
identifying the problematic content and the jurisdictional 
requirements for removing it. Without the logistical and political 
barriers weighing down international law and national enforcement, 
INTERPOL can act faster to identify terrorist speech and sources of 
new threats. 
Should a social media company disagree with or ignore the 
notification resulting from INTERPOL’s monitoring, national judicial 
systems may step in and prosecute. By freeing national governments 
from monitoring, INTERPOL allows the governments to focus more 
on imposing liability against social media companies should they fail 
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to remove content. This adds greater weight to the restrictions on 
content posted and allowed to remain on social media platforms.152 
National jurisdictions may now redirect efforts toward prosecutions 
and the enforcement of criminal punishments against social media 
companies, directly countering their commercial incentives. 
Liability for aiding and abetting supplies the impetus to influence 
social media companies towards more self-censorship should the social 
media companies ignore INTERPOL notices. Once national 
jurisdictions determine that the social media companies have aided 
and abetted terrorist activity by knowingly permitting terrorist 
speech to remain on the platform, criminal or civil penalties can be 
sought against the company. In the United States, violations for 
aiding and abetting receive the same punishment as if the actor had 
committed the crime themselves.153 Given the nature of the 
violation—being speech inciting violence and not violence itself—there 
is room for courts to impose monetary fines or alternative sanctions 
against the companies. Regardless of the exact punishment sought, 
however, criminal liability prevents physical harm sooner than civil 
liability alone, as cases do not require the manifestation of physical 
harm prior to liability.154 The civil lawsuits filed against social media 
companies by terror victims’ families all came after people died due to 
terrorist attacks.155 Pursing criminal liability for terrorist speech 
allows the government to identify the harm not as a completed 
terrorist act, but as the recruitment for or the potential for inciting 
one—thus taking action aimed at stopping the violence before it 
begins. 
Additionally, social media companies should not be threatened by 
the use of government enforcement. Citizens have regularly turned to 
their governments to address national security concerns. And in an 
effort to promote the safety and security of the nation, governments 
have found some rights are not unlimited. For example, U.S. 
corporations do not have an unrestricted right to be bought. Rather, 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. reviews mergers, 
acquisitions, and other corporate transactions to ensure that they do 
not threaten national security.156 This proposal simply reflects the 
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national security concerns arising from the narrowly-defined speech at 
issue. Likewise, this limited definition fits better within the accepted 
understanding, at least in the U.S. of protected First Amendment 
rights. Critics of FOSTA suggest that the elimination of the safe 
harbor in reality makes the world more dangerous, driving sex 
workers underground and inadvertently supporting only those large 
companies which can afford the staff necessary to monitor the 
website.157 In comparison, this proposal rests on an established 
understanding of prohibited speech and actions, and does not require 
any additional monitoring by social media companies due to the 
notice they would receive. Only those companies which choose to fight 
the notification would have to. At the same time however, those 
concerned with abuse by government officials could take comfort in 
the procedural safeguards both in the required notice and the judicial 
system. The unclassified nature of the notices, while this is not a 
guarantee against abuse, does provide a public record should the 
government overstep. 
The outlined approach would simultaneously reinforce a 
preventative focus, while incentivizing social media companies to self-
regulate and monitor for terrorist activity. Holding social media 
companies liable for aiding and abetting introduces the incentives 
necessary for the companies to embrace more self-censorship. 
Responsibility reduces the commercial incentives that undermine the 
creation and enforcement of the content restrictions necessary to 
effectively prevent the spread of terrorist speech.158 Inherently, social 
media companies are profit-making endeavors.159 Facebook alone made 
$8.03 billion from sales in the first quarter of 2017, averaging about 
$4.23 in sales from each user.160 Part of the appeal of these platforms, 
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their perceived role as an open forum for society.161 Imposing criminal 
liability through monetary fines, for example, counters the financial 
benefits causing social media companies’ hesitancy to self-censor. 
Now, rather than viewing each new user just as an additional $4.23 of 
revenue, each user also poses a risk and liability that the company 
must be willing to take on. Free speech can remain a corporate 
principle for the companies because the limited definition of “terrorist 
speech” requires only the restriction of speech likely to incite violence 
or recruit for violent activities.162 Criminal liability permits social 
media companies to continue to pursue profits but imposes a sanction 
should they fail to comply and ignore terrorist speech. 
IV. Holding Social Media Companies Responsible 
Addresses the Residual Concerns Related to Free 
Expression and National Sovereignty. 
 
This proposal resolves the ideological and logistical 
implementation problems facing current responses to ISIS’s terrorist 
speech, but also the more fundamental considerations made when 
determining how to respond in the first place. Each response chosen 
by a company or government reflects a decision about what values—
whether freedom of expression or national security—the decision 
maker prioritizes. Similarly, when looking at the implementation of 
any new program, particularly one influenced by international law, 
nations will likely hesitate to give up sovereignty on such an 
important issue. The implementation of an aiding and abetting 
standard through a mixture of international and national systems, 
however, copes with these challenges by recognizing each state’s 
different security in the course of pursuing global security. 
A. The Limited Scope of Liability Respects Free Expression While 
Securing a Means of Increasing National and Global Security. 
 
States and companies make decisions about what they should 
prioritize every single day. When it comes to social media and 
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terrorism, these decisions often hinge on how much the decision 
makers value the freedom of speech in comparison to national 
security.163 Facebook’s Vice President of Global Public Policy, Marne 
Levine, addressed the balance Facebook sought to strike between 
these two concerns stating: 
We work hard to remove hate speech [which often includes 
incitement] quickly, however there are instances of offensive 
content, including distasteful humor, that are not hate speech 
according to our definition. In these cases, we work to apply 
fair, thoughtful, and scalable policies. This approach allows us 
to continue defending the principles of freedom of self-expression 
on which Facebook is founded.”164 
Germany sought to strike a different balance. With the passage of 
the “Facebook law,” German lawmakers wanted to impose fines on 
social media platforms which fail to remove hate speech and content 
inciting violence.165 Digital rights and free speech activists opposed the 
measure, arguing the regulation overly-restricted social media 
platforms.166 Justifying the restriction, German Justice Minister Heiko 
Maas stated, “[T]he ability to bring big consequences for companies 
[is] necessary in combating hate speech and radicalized content 
online.”167 The tension between free speech and security raises a 
question which goes to the heart of how best to respond to terrorist 
speech, but also highlights the different values held by each state and 
company.168 By using the international resources of INTERPOL, but 
limiting them to the national terrorist lists and specific types of 
speech, states gain control over the process. This enables the state to 
target only the specific groups they believe sufficiently threaten their 
national security to justify a limitation on free speech. 
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B. States Maintain Control Over The System, Protecting Their 
Sovereignty, Through the Integration of State Terrorist Designations and 
Judicial Systems. 
 
At any time during this process, nations can choose to completely 
opt out of the system by blocking social media companies or choosing 
not to prosecute. Since China gained access to the internet, the 
government has censored access to certain websites.169 With over 700 
million internet users—equating to 1 in every 4 of the internet’s 
population—China leads the world in e-commerce and online 
activity.170 The security of the government, however, depends on its 
ability to block those websites that disrupt the Communist Party’s 
narrative, while permitting the growing technological and commercial 
benefits the internet facilitates.171 States dissatisfied with the joint 
enforcement plan always have the option to completely block social 
media companies like China has done. Alternatively, states could 
choose not to pursue prosecutions against the companies, thereby 
permitting unrestricted free expression on the platforms. Hopefully, 
states would not choose either option. They always have, however, a 
means of protecting their national sovereignty should they believe the 
concerns outweigh the benefits. 
Additionally, utilizing existing INTERPOL resources has little 
impact on current efforts by governments or social media companies 
to stop terrorist speech. At a minimum, including INTERPOL adds a 
beneficial resource rather than a challenge to sovereignty or a draw on 
resources. Little, if anything, about this proposal forces social media 
companies or national governments to change what they already do. 
Governments may specify that the content only be taken down after 
recording all usable information to trace the producers or after storing 
the content for counter-propaganda purposes. While including 
INTERPOL in the discussion and imposing liability would change the 
incentives motivating both social media companies and aid in 
allocating national resources towards prosecutions, a state does not 
have to prioritize the resources if it chooses not to. 
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V. Conclusion 
Lacking the traditional trappings of state and country, non-state 
actors have and are forcing the national security community to 
rethink their responses. Following 9/11, the U.S. recognized the need 
for international cooperation and collaboration in preventing future 
failures in immigration, like those that permitted the 9/11 hijackers to 
enter the country.172 A similar solution is necessary to effectively 
address terrorist speech on social media—a solution found in an 
international aiding and abetting standard. By relying on customary 
international law for the standard and using a combination of 
INTERPOL and national governments for implementation, 
governments can effectively reduce the threat posed by terrorist 
content inciting or recruiting for violence. Through national 
governments’ existing terrorist designations and the increased 
monitoring by INTERPOL the political concerns in identifying 
“terrorist speech” and the quantity of terrorist speech are reduced. 
Subsequent removal or failure to remove such speech by the social 
media companies then becomes an issue remedied through established 
court systems. Uniting the strengths of international law with the 
resources available in national jurisdictions resolves the need for a 
comprehensive approach while simultaneously recognizing and 
respecting differences nations may have regarding what constitutes 
terrorism. 
Nations should acknowledge the role social media companies have 
come to play in society, as well as the companies’ stake in stopping 
terrorism. When social media companies fail to remove known 
terrorist speech, their inaction facilitates violence. Free speech and 
freedom from unnecessary government interference must be balanced 
against security simultaneously sought from the government. In 
seeking to reduce or eliminate the corruption of free speech by non-
state actors’ liability for those companies maintaining access to the 
speech should be considered. 
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